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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman attacked and fatally shot Trayvon
Martin in Sanford, Florida.1 The seventeen-year-old boy was only carrying an
Arizona Iced Tea and a bag of Skittles when Zimmerman killed him.2 In 2013,
Zimmerman was charged, inter alia, with second-degree murder in Florida v.
Zimmerman.3 That July, a six-person jury found Zimmerman not guilty on all
charges.4 The night of the verdict was a turning point that shifted the minds of
many in Black America. That night, Alicia Garza, a civil rights activist and
community organizer, wrote in a Facebook post “a love letter to black people.”5
In that post, she affirmed the Black community of its worth, writing “black lives
matter.” The phrase had never before been used.6
On August 9, 2014, a different shift happened––this time, a shift in the
movement of Black America. In Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson
killed Michael Brown, an eighteen-year-old Black boy, by gunshot.7 Ferguson
became ground zero, as a nationwide movement against police brutality and antiBlack racism engulfed the United States of America. That same year, police killed
forty-three-year-old Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York,8 and twelve-year-old
Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio.9 Eric Garner, Mike Brown, and Tamir Rice joined
Trayvon Martin in becoming household names and faces. The stories of those and
other Black men and boys killed by the police became “an impetus for public

1

Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin- shooting-fast-facts/index.html.
2
Leo Benedictus, How Skittles became a symbol of Trayvon Martin’s innocence, THE GUARDIAN
(July 15, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2013/jul/15/skittles-trayvonmartin-zimmerman-acquittal.
3
Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
See Alicia Garza, THE PURPOSE OF POWER (2020).
6
Garza is the co-creator of #BlackLivesMatter and the Black Lives Matter Global Network. It
should be noted that the Network’s co-creators––Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi––are
all Black women. BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com.
7
Timeline of Events in shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 8,
2019), https://apnews.com/article/9aa32033692547699a3b61da8fd1fc62.
8
Daniel Pantaleo killed Eric Garner by illegal chokehold. Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold:
The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric- garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html.
9
Timothy Loehmann killed Tamir Rice in less than two seconds after arriving on the scene where
Rice was playing with a toy gun. Shaila Dewan and Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case,
Many Errors by Cleveland Police, Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015)
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/us/in-tamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-bypolice-then-a-fatal-one.html.
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policy debates on the future of police in America.”10
While Black America was rightfully disturbed by the unjust police killings of
Black men and boys, the country was largely silent about the 2014 police killings
of several Black women and girls, including Gabriella Nevarez, Aura Rosser,
Michelle Cusseaux, and Tanisha Anderson.11 Recognizing the lack of discussion
and visibility of Black women and girls, the African American Policy Forum and
the Center for Intersectionality and Social Policy Studies launched the
#SayHerName campaign in December 2014.12 The campaign works to bring
awareness and visibility to these Black women and girls and their stories and
support a gender-inclusive approach to racial justice that centers all Black lives
equally.13
The conversation about police brutality in the United States centers on Black
men and boys and how they are systematically criminalized and feared by the
state and the country. Black women and girls have also been killed by the police
and disproportionately subjected to police brutality; however, their names and,
much more, their stories are rarely heard. Neither the “killings of Black women,
nor the lack of accountability for them, have been widely elevated as exemplars of
the systemic police brutality that is currently the focal point of mass protest and
policy reform efforts.”14 This disparity in discourse indicates that Black women
and their experiences are invisible.
Part II of this article defines and outlines intersectionality, the legal theory
through which society and the law see Black women and their unique
experiences. Part III uses the intersectionality framework to examine the unique
challenges Black women face in the domains of employment discrimination and
police brutality. Part IV examines, through the lens of narrative and storytelling,
how historically false narratives have contributed to existing intersectional
injustices Black women face in employment discrimination and police brutality.
Part V argues that until society and the law acknowledge and account for the lies,
omissions, and their implications for Black women, Black women will continue to
suffer from invisibility. By unearthing the lies and contextualizing them, society
and the law can be better informed on how to address and remedy the injustices
brought on by intersectional issues.

10

Kimberlé Crenshaw and Andrea J. Ritchie, Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against
Black Women, AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM 1 (2015), https://www.aapf.org/sayhername.
[hereinafter Say Her Name Report].
11
Id.
12
#SayHerName Campaign, AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM, https://aapf.org/sayhername.
13
Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 6.
14
Id. at 1.
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II. INTERSECTIONALITY
In 1989, Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the legal theory of
intersectionality in her seminal article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics.15 In the article, Crenshaw explained how race and
gender often interact to create multiple dimensions of experiences for Black
women in the workplace.16 Centering on three employment discrimination
cases,17 Crenshaw criticized the failure of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”) to accommodate plaintiffs at the intersection of two or more
protected categories (i.e., race and sex), the judiciary’s narrow view of
discrimination, and how single-issue analyses harmfully limit how the law
considers both racism and sexism.18 Through this theoretical framework,
Crenshaw discussed how Black women face discrimination in ways that are
unique from the discrimination Black men or white women face.19 Black women
often face “double-discrimination––the combined effects of practices which
discriminate on the basis of race” and also “discrimination as Black women––not
the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black women.”20 This framework
has evolved, particularly in social discourse, to discuss intersectional identities of
all kinds, yet the theory’s roots–– Black women at the intersection of race and
gender––inform the discussion in this article.
III. INTERSECTIONAL CHALLENGES IN 2021
This section explores two key domains in which intersectional issues arise:
employment discrimination and police brutality. First, this section discusses Black
women’s experiences with employment discrimination by examining Title VII, its
interpretation, and shortcomings. This section also reviews intersectionality’s
legal status by examining race-based hair discrimination cases. Second, this
section explores the similarities and differences in how Black men and women
experience police brutality and the importance of acknowledging and correcting
the notable absence of Black women in police brutality discourse.
15

Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
16
Id.
17
DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Moore v. Hughes
Helicopter, 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983); Payne v. Travenol, 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982).
18
Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 152.
19
Id. at 149.
20
Id.
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A. Employment Discrimination
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.21 Employment discrimination cases are generally placed
within two categories, as Title VII prohibits both “disparate treatment” and
“disparate impact” discrimination.22 Disparate treatment occurs when an
employer intentionally discriminates based on a protected characteristic, whereas
disparate impact occurs when a facially neutral employment practice or decision
has a discriminatory effect.23
To succeed in a disparate treatment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must
establish purposeful discrimination under the three-part framework articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.24 First,
plaintiffs must make a prima facie case by articulating that (1) they belong to a
racial minority; (2) they applied and were qualified for a job for which the
employer sought applicants; (3) despite their qualifications, they were rejected;
(4) after their rejection, the employer left the position open and continued to seek
applicants from people of the plaintiffs’ qualifications.25 Second, once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to “articulate26
some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for its rejection.27 Third, should the
employer satisfy the burden of production, the burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual for the
discriminatory decision.28 Ultimately, the burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff.29

21

Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
Yvette Pappoe, The Shortcomings of Title VII for the Black Female Plaintiff, 22 U. PENN. J. L. &
SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 4 (2019).
23
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
24
McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
25
Id. at 802.
26
Employers only have to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason; they do not have to prove that the
articulated reason was the actual reason. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 254 (1981) (“The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.”).
27
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
28
Id. at 804.
29
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (“The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.”).
22
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1. Intersectionality’s Legal Status
Intersectionality is a framework through which people, and the law, can see where
one’s various identities collide and interlock.30 As previously stated, Title VII
protects against discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”31 Crenshaw and other intersectionality scholars have criticized
Title VII’s use of the word “or,” as the word makes it difficult for plaintiffs to
bring a claim on more than one protected category.
Some courts have embraced intersectionality theory in Title VII to allow
plaintiffs to bring claims under more than one protected category.32 The leading
case that followed this practice is Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action
Association.33 In Jefferies, the court asserted that “[t]he use of the word ‘or’
evidences Congress’s intent to prohibit employment discrimination based on any
or all of the listed characteristics.”34 Most federal courts have followed the
Jefferies approach, including a few circuit courts,35 concluding that Title VII “also
protected individuals against discrimination based on the combination or
‘intersection’ of two or more protected classifications, even in the absence of
evidence showing the defendant discriminated solely on the basis of one protected
classification.”36 Even the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, favorably cited the
Jefferies approach.37 Further, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) Compliance Manual states:
Title VII prohibits discrimination not just because of one protected
trait (e.g., race), but also because of the intersection of two or more
protected bases (e.g., race and sex). For example, Title VII
prohibits discrimination against African American women even if
the employer does not discriminate against White women or
African American men. Likewise, Title VII protects Asian
30

“It’s not simply that there’s a race problem here, a gender problem here, and a class or LBGTQ
problem there. Many times that framework erases what happens to people who are subject to all of
these things.” Kimberlé Crenshaw on Intersectionality, More Than Two Decades Later, COLUM.
L. SCH. (June 8, 2017), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/kimberle-crenshawintersectionality-more-two-decades-later.
31
43 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
32
See Diane Avery et al., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 47 (8th ed. 2010).
33
Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
34
Id. at 1032.
35
Westmoreland v. Prince George’s Cty, 876 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (D. Md. 2012) (citing Lam v.
Univ. of Hawai’i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1561-62 (9th Cir. 1994); Hucks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d
1406 (10th Cir. 1987); Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 327 (D. Md. 2003)).
36
Brown v. OMO Group, Inc., 2017 WL 1148743, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2017).
37
See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 n. 10 (1999).
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American women from discrimination based on stereotypes and
assumptions about them “even in the absence of discrimination
against Asian American men or White women.” The law also
prohibits individuals from being subjected to discrimination
because of the intersection of their race and a trait covered by
another EEO statute––e.g., race and disability, or race and age.38
Despite the law’s evolution toward embracing intersectionality in Title VII cases,
statutory language has not changed nor has much of its interpretation.39 Many
courts have refused to use an intersectional framework and instead require
plaintiffs to choose only one of the protected categories.40 Forcing plaintiffs to
choose only one protected category is problematic because those who face
intersectional discrimination (i.e., Black women) must bisect their identity to take
advantage of Title VII protections, leaving them without an adequate remedy.41
2. Hair Discrimination
One area that has gained traction in law and social discourse is “grooming codes
discrimination”42 or discrimination on the basis of hairstyle. Grooming codes
discrimination causes a “specific form of inequality and infringement upon one’s
personhood resulting from the enactment and enforcement of formal as well as
informal appearance and grooming mandates, which bear no relationship to one’s
job qualifications and performance.”43 Black women are 1.5 times more likely to

38

EEOC, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTALS, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL
3, 8-9 (2006),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-15-race-and-color-discrimination [hereinafter EEOC
Compliance Manual].
39
See Bradley A. Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 199, 214 (2006) (“Despite a number of court decisions that have validated
intersectional claims, none of these decisions have generated enough publicity or been handed
down by a court with sufficient authority to set a genuine precedent in an area lacking clear
guidance”); see also Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-) History, 95
B.U. L. REV. 713, 727 (2015) (“Despite the integral role of intersectional experiences in informing
the origins and early development of Title VII, court opinions that acknowledged, much less
discussed, intersectionality were few and far between.”).
40
Pappoe, supra note 22, at 7.
41
Id.
42
“Grooming codes discrimination” was coined by D. Wendy Greene. D. Wendy Greene, Splitting
Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s Take on Workplace Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987 (2017).
43
Id. at 990.
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be sent home from work because of their hair,44 eighty percent more likely to feel
required to change their hairstyle for work,45 and thirty percent more likely to be
made aware of a grooming policy.46 Black women’s hair is 3.4 times more likely
to be seen as unprofessional.47 If one conducted a Google search for
“unprofessional hairstyles for women,” most of the images would be of Black
women in natural hairstyles; conversely, a Google search for “professional
hairstyles for women” boasts of mostly white women whom almost all have
straight hair.48 Currently, Title VII does not protect against discrimination on the
basis of hairstyle.
The seminal case on Black hair, grooming restrictions, and the latter’s effect
on Black women is Rogers v. American Airlines.49 Renee Rodgers, an American
Airlines flight attendant, filed a suit under Title VII, arguing that the airline
discriminated against her “as a woman, and more specifically a black woman” via
its grooming policy that prohibited customer-contact employees, like flight
attendants, from wearing braids.50 Rodgers asserted that cornrows, her hairstyle,
have “special significance for black women” and have been “historically, a
fashion and style adopted by Black American women, reflective of cultural,
historical essence of the Black women in American society.”51 The district court
separated Rodgers’ claim into two separate analyses: a sex discrimination
analysis and a racial discrimination analysis.52 The court did not, as Rodgers
requested in her complaint, employ an intersectional analysis that accounted for
both race and sex.
The court first dismissed Rodger’s claim of gender discrimination on the
ground that the prohibition on braids applied to both men and women.53 Further,
the court reasoned that women wearing braids more often than men was
44

The CROWN Research Study, DOVE (2019), https://thecrownact.com.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See GOOGLE IMAGES, images.google.com. This has been criticized for several years without
change. See also Leigh Alexander, Do Google’s ‘unprofessional hair’ results show it is racist?,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/08/doesgoogle-unprofessional-hair-results-prove-algorithms- racist.
49
527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The published case name misspells the plaintiff’s last name;
the correct spelling is “Rodgers.” This article will use “Rodgers” when referring to the plaintiff
and “Rogers” when referring to the case. See Paulette M. Caldwell, Intersectional Bias and the
Courts: The Story of Rogers v. American Airlines, RACE LAW STORIES 571, 572 (2008) (revealing
the misspelling and proper spelling of Rodgers).
50
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
51
Id. at 231-32.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 231.
45
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inconsequential, as the policy did not “regulate on the basis of any immutable
characteristic of the employees.”54 The court then dismissed Rodgers’ claim of
racial discrimination.55 The court underscored that the policy applied to all
races,56 then it used the immutability doctrine to ground its distinguishable legal
treatment of cornrows and afros.57 According to the court, federal protections
against racial discrimination are limited to employers discriminating based on
immutable characteristics.58 Immutable characteristics or traits are those “with
which one is born, are fixed, difficult to change, and/or displayed by individuals
who share the same racial identity.”59 Under this, the court reasoned that an
actionable racial discrimination claim required evidence that showed Black
people exclusively or predominantly wore braids.60 “By articulating this
evidentiary standard, it appears that the Rogers court presumed that a workplace
prohibition against afros constituted a form of race discrimination because
African descendants predominantly or exclusively don or are born with an
afro.”61 The court, however, noted that Rodgers “first appeared at work in the allbraided hairstyle” soon after Bo Derek, a white actress, popularized cornrows
(among non-Black people) while wearing them in a film.62 Because of this, the
court reasoned that Rodgers did not meet its essentialist requirement and
devalued the reality that cornrows have cultural significance.63
Though the court conceded that a policy prohibiting afros might offend Title
VII because afros fall under immutable characteristics, it contended that braids
were different because the hairstyle was an “easily changed characteristic.”64 In
short, the court dismissed Rodgers’ claims because the policy did “not regulate
on the basis of any immutable characteristic” and it applied equally65 to both
races and sexes.”66 It never addressed the intersectional claim as presented.
A more recent example is found in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management
54

Id.
Id. at 234.
56
Id. at 231.
57
Greene, supra note 42, at 998.
58
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231-32.
59
Greene, supra note 42, at 998 (citing Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231-32).
60
Id. (citing Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232).
61
Id.
62
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 234.
63
Greene, supra note 42, at 998-99 (citing Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232) (“The court effectively
concluded that since a white woman braided her hair, donning cornrows could in no way inform
Ms. Rodgers’ understand of herself as a Black woman.”).
64
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
65
The themes from this article contend that the application was not, in fact, equal.
66
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title
VII, 98 Geo L. J. 1080, 1091-92 (2010).
55
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Solutions.67 In 2010, Chastity Jones applied to Catastrophe Management
Solutions (“CMS”) to work in its call center, and CMS eventually offered Jones
the job.68 To secure her schedule, Jones had to meet with the company’s human
resources manager, Jeannie Wilson, a white woman.69 After meeting with
Wilson, Jones prepared to leave. On her way out, Wilson asked whether Jones’
hair was in “dreadlocks,”70 to which Jones replied in the affirmative.71 Wilson
then said she could not hire Jones “with the dreadlocks,” telling Jones, “they tend
to get messy, although I’m not saying yours are, but you know what I’m talking
about.”72 Wilson also told Jones that a Black male applicant cut his locs as a
condition of employment, implying that Jones would have to do the same thing.73
After Jones expressed that she would not cut her hair, Wilson rescinded the job
offer and asked for Jones’ paperwork.74 Jones returned the paperwork then left.75
The EEOC sued on behalf of Jones and was informed by critical race
scholarship in its arguments. The EEOC first argued that the immutability
doctrine is rooted in a now-debunked view of race as a biological construct
instead of a social one.76 In order to maintain white superiority in practices like
slavery or race-based violence, “social, political, and legal actors actively
fostered notions of race and racial difference as inheritable and fixed.”77 Because
of this, race has never been exclusively based on one’s skin color or heritage.78
Historically and presently, mutable characteristics like one’s hair texture and
hairstyle, dress, name, or accent have been treated as indicators of racial identity
by both law and society.79 The EEOC then argued that distinguishing between
natural hair growth and natural hairstyles as immutable and mutable, respectively,
was disingenuous.80 Afros, braids, and locs are all ways to wear natural hair, so
the styles are linked.
Meaningfully, the EEOC highlighted the burdens and consequences Black
67

852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id.
69
Id. at 1021.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
852 F.3d 1018, 1021.
73
Id. at 1021-22.
74
Id. at 1022.
75
Id.
76
Greene, supra note 42, at 1009; Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Def. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions’ Mot. to
Dismiss, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d (2014) (No. 13-cv-00476-CB-M),
2014 WL 4745282, at *6 [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief].
77
Greene, supra note 42, at 1009.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1011; see Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 76.
68
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women uniquely face from grooming codes that prohibit natural hairstyles. The
EEOC explained that workplace prohibitions against afros, locs, braids, and
twists effectively require Black women to wear straightened hair by way of
weaves, wigs, or extensions or by applying extreme heat or chemical relaxers to
their hair.81 The Commission noted that these methods of achieving and
maintaining straightened hair are expensive, time-consuming, and damaging to
Black women’s physical well-being.82 Further, these upkeep methods can also
damage Black women’s emotional well-being.83
A recent study found that Black women are more likely to spend more time
on their hair than white women do, go to hair salons more often than white
women do, spend more money on products for their hair than white women do,
report higher levels of anxiety related to their hair compared to white women, are
twice as likely to feel social pressure to straighten their hair for work, and are
three times as likely to not engage in exercise and other physical activities
because of their hair since maintaining straightened hair as a Black woman is a
significant monetary and time investment.84
The district court rejected the EEOC’s arguments and dismissed the
complaint, holding the EEOC could not bring a plausible claim of intentional race
discrimination.85 On appeal, the circuit first addressed the EEOC’s theory of
liability. The court concluded that the EEOC was conflating disparate impact and
disparate treatment theories of liability by describing the consequences of CMS’
policy with terms like “adverse effects,” “impact,” and “disadvantage.”86
Following this, the circuit court did not consider the burdens or consequences of a
locs ban on Black women.87 The court stated that its focus would be on analyzing
whether the protected trait motivated American Airlines’ decision to impose its
policy.88 To answer the question, the circuit court concluded that a protected trait
under Title VII is one that an individual is “born with or cannot change.”89 The
circuit court then reasoned that “discrimination on the basis of black hair texture
(an immutable characteristic) is prohibited by Title VII, while adverse action on
81

First Amended Complaint at ¶ 27, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT
(S.D. Ala. 2014) (No. 14-13482).
82
Id.; Greene, supra note 42, at 1012.
83
The “Good Hair” Study, Perception Institute, https://perception.org/goodhair (last visited Apr.
21, 2021).
84
Id.
85
Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1144 (S.D. Ala. 2014).
86
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d 1156, 1158-1162 (11th Cir. 2016), withdrawn by
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016).
87
Greene, supra note 42, at 1021.
88
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d at 1163.
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the basis of black hairstyle (a mutable choice) is not.”90 This resulted in the
circuit court’s ruling that for locs to be seen as a racial instead of a cultural
characteristic, plaintiffs would have to claim that locs were not a “function of
personal choice, but rather that all, and/or only, individuals who identify as
African descendants donned locks or are born with them.”91 Critical race theory
teaches that such a task is impossible.92
While courts are reluctant to protect Black women against hair
discrimination, some legislative changes have been made. In 2019, the CROWN
Coalition and Dove created the CROWN (Creating a Respectful and Open World
for Natural Hair) Act. The CROWN Act’s purpose is to “ensure protection
against discrimination based on race-based hairstyles by extending statutory
protection to hair texture and protective styles such as braids, locs, twists, and
knots in the workplace and public schools.”93 On July 3, 2019, California was the
first state to sign the CROWN Act into law. After Deandre Arnold, an eighteenyear-old Texas high schooler, was told he would not be able to graduate unless he
cut his locs, Academy Award winner Matthew A. Cherry invited him to the 92nd
Academy Awards show on February 9, 2020.94 The CROWN Act, which was
already being discussed, received a boost when Cherry advocated for it in his
acceptance speech. So far, the CROWN Act is law in nine states and recently
passed in the United States House of Representatives.95
B. Police Brutality
Awareness of anti-Black police brutality and racial injustice in the United States
is at an all-time high and steadily increasing since the killing of Michael Brown.
On May 25, 2020, Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd, an unarmed Black man,
by pressing his knee into Floyd’s neck for nine minutes and twenty-nine

90

EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d at 1167 (11th Cir. 2016).
Greene, supra note 42, at 1022 (citing EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d 1156 (11th
Cir. 2016)).
92
See, e.g., Ian Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) (“There are no genetic
characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by non-Blacks; similarly, there is no gene or cluster
of genes common to all Whites but not to non-Whites.”).
93
The CROWN Act, https://www.thecrownact.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
94
Amir Vera, What You Need to Know about the CROWN Act, CNN (Feb. 9, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/09/entertainment/crown-act-oscars-trnd/index.html.
95
The CROWN Act, https://www.thecrownact.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2021) (States at the time
of publication include California, New Jersey, New York, Colorado, Washington, Virginia,
Maryland, Connecticut, and Delaware).
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seconds.96 Floyd’s death, captured on video, went viral and sparked new life into
the long and widespread movement against and debate on police brutality and
racism in the United States. Protests and discourse worldwide have pressured
police departments and politicians in the United States and abroad to come up
with a solution.
The general discourse around anti-Black police brutality does not largely
include Black women. For the most part, statistics and discussions are either
gender neutral97 or exclusively focused on Black men. Discussion on Black
women who are victims and survivors of police brutality is rare. Because of this,
finding information about Black women who have suffered from police brutality
is laborious, allowing for Black women to be erased from the narrative and
rendering them invisible.98
1. Black Women and Black Men Experience Police Brutality Similarly
This erasure of Black women is not the result of missing data. Black women’s
experiences with police brutality often fall within commonly understood
narratives used to discuss police brutality against Black men.99
Even where women and girls are present in the data, narratives
framing police profiling and lethal force as exclusively male
experiences lead researchers, the media, and advocates to exclude
them. For example, although racial profiling data are rarely, if
ever, disaggregated by gender and race, when race and gender are
considered together, researchers find that “for both men and
women there is an identical pattern of stops by race/ethnicity.”100
The killing of Breonna Taylor is a recent and popular101 example of Black women
96

Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Prosecutors Say Derek Chauvin Knelt on George Floyd for 9
Minutes 29 Seconds, Longer Than Initially Reported, N.Y. TIMES (March 30, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd-kneel-9-minutes-29seconds.html.
97
See e.g., People shot to death by U.S. police, by race 2017-2020, Statista (Nov. 30, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/585152/people-shot-to-death-by-us-police-by-race (a genderneutral reporting); Justin Nix et al., A Birds Eye View of Civilians Killed by Police in 2015:
Further Evidence of Implicit Bias, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 309 (2017) (discussing
how Black people who were killed by police were twice as likely as white people to be unarmed).
98
Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 4.
99
Id. at 7.
100
Id. at 4.
101
As discussed throughout this paper, a Black woman who is a victim of police brutality rarely
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falling within familiar police brutality narratives. On March 13, 2020, Taylor, a
26-year-old Black female emergency medical technician, was asleep with her
boyfriend when Louisville police officers forcibly entered her apartment.102 The
police officers fired sixteen rounds of bullets into the apartment—six of those
bullets struck and killed Taylor.103
The killing of Mya Hall provides another example. National Security Agency
(“NSA”) police killed Hall, a Black transgender woman, on March 30, 2015, in
Baltimore, Maryland––just weeks before Freddie Gray’s death grabbed national
headlines.104 Hall took a wrong turn onto NSA property and crashed into a
security gate and police car.105 Though Hall was unarmed and nonthreatening to
the facility, NSA officers did not attempt to use nonlethal force; instead, they
fatally shot her.106
2. Black Women and Black Men Experience Police Brutality Differently
While Black women are killed by the police in situations and ways that are similar
to those of Black men, Black women are also killed in gender-specific contexts
(i.e., domestic violence responses).107 Further, police are less likely to protect
Black women when their partners or community members murder, beat, or abuse
them.108 The invisibility of Black women, especially in their unique experiences,
leads to less demand for police accountability when police kill Black women.
For example, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on December 22, 2002, Nizah
Morris, a Black transgender woman, was found injured and unconscious.109
Minutes before, police officers dropped Morris off at home.110 Thomas Berry, one
of the police officers, returned to where Morris was reported to be bleeding and
unconscious and, instead of helping her, covered “her face while she was still
alive.”111 Morris was left, without help, at the scene of the crime for forty minutes
becomes a household name. It should be noted that wide knowledge and subsequent outrage about
Taylor’s death was not immediate but happened after several months.
102
Richard A. Oppel Jr., et al., What to Know about Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html.
103
Id.
104
Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 8.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 21.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 25.
110
Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 25.
111
Princess Harmony Rodriguez, Whose Lives Matter: Trans Women of Color and Police
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before being taken to a hospital.112 She died two days later of a severe head
injury, resulting from being beaten with the butt of a gun. Police claimed not to
know what happened, and Morris’ death remains unsolved.113 The gender-specific
violence perpetrated by police against Black women continues in 2021, with
Black transgender women even more vulnerable.
3. Why Include Black Women?
Including Black women and girls in the discourse around police brutality is
needed for several reasons. To start, more inclusive discussion broadens the
narrative and enhances the understanding of the structural relationship between
Black communities and the police.114 “Acknowledging and analyzing the
connections between anti-Black violence against Black men, women, transgender
[people], and gender-nonconforming people reveals systemic realities that go
unnoticed when the focus is limited exclusively to cases involving [cisgender
Black men].”115 Society cannot fully consider all of the ways Black people are
victimized by police brutality until it considers all Black people.
Another reason why centering all Black lives in police brutality discourse is
important is that it allows society to realize that isolated “fixes” are not
effective.116 Ultimately, including Black women and girls in police brutality
discourse signals that all Black lives matter.117 Families of Black women who
were killed by the police are less likely to be invited to speak at rallies and do not
receive the same level of media attention, political consideration, or community
support as do families grieving Black men killed by the police.118 Black women
and girls deserve the same level of collective outrage that Black men and boys
receive when they are brutalized and killed by police with impunity.
IV. THE BASIS OF OUR PRESENT TROUBLE
Bringing visibility to Black women in the eyes of the law and social justice
movements is not easy. The problem of Black women’s invisibility is rooted in a
Violence, BGD (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.bgdblog.org/2014/12/whose-lives-matter-transwomen-color-police-violence/.
112
Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 25.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 6.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 7.
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historical system of oppression that is based on lies and omissions. The
relationship between Black women and the state was birthed in violence fueled by
those lies and omissions.119 Masters of the enslaved could legally kill, maim, and
mutilate Black people;120 to justify that violence, white people lied.121
A. Promiscuity
Black women’s enslavement was marked by sexual abuse and rape, driven by
white people’s moral depravity or economics.122 To justify it, white people
claimed that “Black women were lascivious, wild creatures without morals, who
needed to be tamed in order to get any work out of them.”123
The violence Black women experienced was often, and is still, as deeply
rooted in gender as in color.124 An immense part of that dually rooted violence
includes the rape and sexual assault of Black women––practices maintained by
false narratives created and protected by tropes, stereotypes, and law. In the Jim
Crow era, a century of legal racial segregation, white men continued to sexually
assault and kill Black women. During this time, the law not only failed to protect
Black women but also helped those who harmed them.125 The dehumanization of
119

Michelle S. Jacobs, The Violent State: Black Women’s Invisible Struggle Against Police
Violence, 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 39, 44 (2017).
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James Baldwin, Address at Second Baptist Church (May 10, 1963) (transcript available in the
American Archive of Public Broadcasting).
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See Jacobs, supra note 119, at 44-45 (“When importation was banned, the holders turned
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THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY, 24 (1997) (“The
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their slaves’ reproductive capacity. With owners expecting natural multiplication to generate as
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Jacobs, supra note 119, at 45.
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(1990).
125
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Black women by white people continued as they created tropes about Black
women’s inherent promiscuity.126
One false, dominant narrative about Black women was the Jezebel stereotype.
While white men portrayed white women as models of self-control, modesty, and
sexual purity, they simultaneously portrayed Black women as animals––
specifically, sexual animals who lacked control over their libido.127 Black women
were caricatured as “purely lascivious creature[s]: not only [were they] governed
by [their] erotic desires, but [their] sexual prowess led men to wanton passion.”128
These historical tropes birthed stereotypes and false narratives that continue to
dominate today’s minds, laws, and policies; further, those false narratives serve as
the foundation for how the country and, specifically, the government sees (or does
not see) Black women and the violence perpetrated against them.
Unsurprisingly, another false, dominant narrative about Black women was
that they were inherent liars.129 During slavery, Black people could not testify in
court against white people, as they were considered incapable of being honest.130
“[African women were believed to be] ignorant, . . . treacherous, thiev[es] and
mistrustful.”131 This narrative also continued postbellum and remained in the
courts.132 Social scientists who study prosecutions of rape cases have noted jurors’
resistance to believing Black women, and judges tend to consider the testimony of
Black women as less credible than the testimony of others.133
(2017); see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law Only As an Enemy”:
The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws
of Virginia, 70 N. C. L. REV. 969, 1056-57 (1992) (outlining states whose laws explicitly defined
rape as a crime that could only be committed against white women and states whose laws did not
have that language but whose courts did not prosecute rapes against Black women).
126
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WHITE, supra note 126, at 38.
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129
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130
Higginbotham & Jacobs, supra note 125 at 994-97; THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY
AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 232 (1996).
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Marilyn Yarbrough & Crystal Bennett, Cassandra and the “Sistahs”: The Peculiar Treatment
of African American Women in the Myth of Women as Liars, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 625, 635
(2000) (citing Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bath Water, Racial Imagery and
Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WISC. L.
REV. 1003, 1033 (1995)).
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For example, a judge in a 1912 case wrote, “This court will never take the word of a nigger
against the word of a white man.” Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 158.
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Gary LaFree et al., Rape and Criminal Justice: The Social Construction of Sexual Assault, Vol.
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The narratives of Black women as immoral, oversexed creatures protected the
white men who brutalized them.134 More troubling was that the law echoed those
narratives, and in the eyes of the law, Black women could not be raped.135 Lies
about Black women led to the sequential omission of accounts of sexual violence
perpetrated against them. During American slavery, the rape of a Black woman by
any man of any race was not a crime; rape statutes defined rape only as a crime
against white women.136 “The crime of rape does not exist in this State between
African slaves,” a defense attorney argued in George v. State.137 “The regulations
of law, as to the white race, on the subject of sexual intercourse, do not and
cannot, for obvious reasons, apply to slaves; their intercourse is promiscuous, and
the violation of a female slave by a male slave would be a mere assault and
battery.”138 Further, the narrative of Black women being dishonest closed the door
for Black survivors of sexual violence to be believed. Literature on sexual
violence and Black women in the United States is scarce, as the discourse around
sexual violence still largely centers on white women.139 The false narrative of
Black women’s hypersexuality––and Black women’s vulnerability to being sexual
assault––continued postbellum and remain relevant to current issues regarding
how the law perceives Black women who have been sexually assaulted or raped.
B. Superhumanization
A recent study found that white people were more likely to “implicitly and
explicitly superhumanize” Black people.140 Another study found that white
people, including white medical students and healthcare professionals, were more
likely to believe that Black people’s bodies are unable to feel pain, have “less
sensitive nerve endings,” and are “biologically different” from and stronger than
white people’s bodies.141 These current beliefs are also rooted in historical lies
also Geneva Brown, Ain’t I a Victim: The Intersection of Race, Class and Gender in Domestic
Violence and the Courtroom, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 147, 154-55 (2012).
134
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138
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139
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140
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352, 352 (2014).
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about Black people.142 While this false narrative most obviously implicates issues
in the healthcare sector, particularly for Black women, it also carries implications
in police brutality. The superhumanizing of Black people––most often Black men
but also Black women––can lead to Black women being “treated punitively, denied
help, and left to suffer in unbearable circumstances while in police custody.”143
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Eradicating double-discrimination on the basis of race and gender will not be
simple nor found in a single solution. To tackle the unique employment
discrimination Black women face, all three branches of government must take
action to acknowledge and make space for Black women in the intersection. To
properly address police brutality, policymakers and individuals must advocate and
learn through an intersectional framework. People and structures in power must
work separately and collectively toward Black women’s equality.
A. Employment Discrimination
The governmental branches should exercise their powers to address intersectional
discrimination. The EEOC should provide guidance on interpreting Title VII,
Congress should amend Title VII, and courts should adopt intersectional
analytical frameworks.
1. Executive
The EEOC has acknowledged intersectional discrimination;144 however, it did not
provide courts with guidance on how to interpret Title VII to allow for actionable
intersectional claims.145 The EEOC should issue clear guidelines for the judiciary
regarding intersectional claims.146 Doing so would allow courts to acknowledge
that intersectional discrimination is cognizable and help them create an analytical
framework for adjudicating intersectional claims.147
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2. Legislative
Congress should amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to clearly state that
discrimination is prohibited on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Others have suggested that the language should include “or any
combination thereof” at the end of the list of protected categories.148 A change of
this sort would be a strong signaling in support of intersectionality.
3. Judicial
Courts that have not yet joined the ranks of those that have adopted an
intersectional framework for distinct discrimination claims should do so. If courts
unanimously use an intersectional analytical framework, Black women in all parts
of the country can make more holistic claims in court without needing to bisect
their identity in hopes of receiving some protection. To achieve this, courts should
account for the sociopolitical and legal history of Black women when crafting this
framework.149
B. Police Brutality
Policymakers should form agendas and platforms that view issues through an
intersectional framework. This gender-inclusive lens will better address police
violence because the myriad of ways Black people are affected will be seen.150
Policymakers should also support and introduce gender-specific policies to
address the unique issues Black women experience with police.151 Individuals
should be diligent to discover and uplift the names and stories of Black women
who suffer from police brutality. At protests and demonstrations, in public spaces
or private homes, individuals can search for a Black woman and say her name.
For a Black woman’s name to be said, her name must first be seen. One by one,
truth by truth, society can work to bring visibility to Black women.
VI. CONCLUSION
In seeking to make a living and claim space in social justice movements, Black
women are fighting for visibility in their life and death. Black women have a unique
148
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identity because they are at the intersection of at least two protected categories: race
and gender. However, the country’s legal system and social justice movements do
little to see Black women and their unique identity in that intersection. This
invisibility precludes Black women from enjoying legal protections, social value,
and, ultimately, freedom. Black people cannot be free until all Black people are free.
True liberation can only be found by first unearthing historical lies and omissions that
inform and have formed today’s problems. After that unearthing, society must tell the
truth and do the work to make its spaces more inclusive of those in the intersection.
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